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GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS: STIFLING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
IN THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE
Julie A. Wenell*
INTRODUCTION
On May 30, 2006, more than 19.4 million public employees nationwide' lost a
battle in the war being waged against free speech. Upon deciding Garcetti v. Ceballos,
the Supreme Court held that "when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline."2 The subsequent chilling effect this decision will have on the most
honest of civil servants has the potential to result in both public and private sector
conduct going unreported.3 The First Amendment famously provides that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances."4 The Court has repeatedly announced that First Amendment pro-
tection includes "the receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of free
expression," because "public debate must not only be unfettered; it must be in-
formed."5 Public employee speech must be considered an essential element of this
protection because "[w]hen government employees are silenced, it is the public that
is the principal loser."
6
This Note advocates a return to the balancing test enunciated in Pickering v.
Board of Education7 as opposed to the per se rule adopted by the Court in Garcetti.
Part I discusses the factual background and legal argument made by the Court in
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2008; B.S., Iowa State University, 2005. I wish
to thank John F, Fatino for pointing me in the right direction, as well as my family and
friends for their ever-present love and support.
U.S. Census Bureau, Public Employment and Payroll Data, http://www.census.gov-
govs/www/apes.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
2 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
See What Price Free Speech? Whistleblowers and the Ceballos Decision: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. 26 (2006) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Stephen M. Kohn, Chair, National Whistleblower Center).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
' Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867-68 n.20 (1982) (plurality opinion) (citation
omitted).
6 Brief for Respondent at 14, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No. 04-473),
2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 476, at *33.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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Garcetti.8 Part II reviews public employee speech jurisprudence throughout the
history of the Court.9 Part Ill discusses the aftermath of the Garcerti decision,
including the impact the decision will have on government whistleblowers,
prosecutors, and public school teachers.' 0 Part m1 also presents and rebuts the policy
considerations in favor of the per se rule adopted by the Court." The Note
concludes that the best way to protect the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech for public employees is to reinstate the Pickering balancing test, which
weighs the employee's interest in free speech against the employer's interest in
operating an efficient workplace.' 2
I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
The factual background of Garcetti deserves recitation in order to gain an accurate
picture of the speech that the Court deemed unprotected and the actions that resulted.
In 1998, Richard Ceballos was employed as a deputy district attorney at the Los
Angeles County District Attorney's Office. '3 He served as a calendar deputy which
gave him supervisory responsibility over two to three deputy district attorneys.' 4 A
defense attorney in a case being prosecuted by the District Attorney's Office in-
formed Ceballos that he believed that one of the deputy sheriffs may have lied in an
affidavit necessary to gain a critical search warrant.' 5 The defense attorney asked
Ceballos to investigate.' 6 After conducting an investigation, Ceballos determined
that the affidavit "at the least, grossly misrepresented the facts."' 7 Following this
discovery, Ceballos authored a memorandum addressed to the defense attorney, the
parties in the case, and his supervisor, District Attorney Gil Garcetti.' The memo
outlined Ceballos' concern regarding the affidavit and recommended that the
District Attorney dismiss the case.' 9 After a heated discussion and pressure from the
Sheriff's Office, the District Attorney chose to disregard Ceballos' recommendation
8 See infra Part I.
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Part III.
i See infra Part III.
12 See infra Part III.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
"' Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1951
(2006).
" Id. at 1170-71.
16 Id. at 1171.
17 id.
IS Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955.
'9Id. at 1955-56.
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and proceed with the case.20 Ceballos was then called to testify for the defense at
a hearing on the defense's motion to traverse regarding the observations Ceballos
made in the memorandum about the affidavit and the information uncovered during
his investigation.2'
Following the hearing, a number of retaliatory employment actions occurred,
leading Ceballos to file suit. 22 Ceballos was reassigned, demoted to a position as a
trial deputy, transferred to another courthouse,23 and denied a promotion.24 Ceballos
initiated a grievance, which was denied, and then filed suit2 under 42 U.S.C.
§ 198326 claiming that his supervisors "violated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments by retaliating against him."27 The district court granted Garcetti' s motion for
summary judgment based on the conclusion that the memo was not entitled to First
Amendment protection.28 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the mere fact that
"Ceballos prepared his memorandum in fulfillment of a regular employment re-
sponsibility does not serve to deprive him of the First Amendment protection
afforded to public employees."'29 The Ninth Circuit determined that the allegations
of wrongdoing in the memorandum were a form of protected speech under the First
Amendment.30 The court applied the balancing test provided by Pickering v. Board
of Education and developed in Connick v. Myers.3'
Garcetti appealed to the Supreme Court, where the case was initially argued on
October 12, 2005.32 The case had not yet been decided when Justice O'Connor re-
tired in January 2006. 33 The case was reargued on March 21, 2006. 34 The assumption
20 Id. at 1956.
21 Id.
22 id.
23 Ceballos was transferred from the Pomona Branch to the El Monte Branch. He referred
to this treatment as "an act of 'Freeway Therapy,' a practice of punishing deputy district
attorneys by assigning them to a branch requiring a long commute to work." Ceballos v.
Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
24 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956.
25 Id.
26 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured .....
27 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956.
28 Id.
29 Ceballosv. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1169,1178 (9th Cir2004), vacated, 126S. Ct. 1951(2006).
30 Id. at 1173.
31 Id.
32 Transcript of Oral Argument, Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (No. 04-473), 2005 U.S.
TRANS LEXIS 52, at *1.
33 Linda Greenhouse, Some Whistle-Blowers Lose Free-Speech Protections, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 2006, at A16.
34 Id.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
of many commentators was that Justice Alito would break the deadlock among the
remaining Justices who had originally heard the case.35 In reality the situation was
considerably more complex.36 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito joined the majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy. Justices
Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented.38
B. The Decision
The majority opinion first summarized public employee free speech jurispru-
dence to set the stage for a new twist on the law.39 Justice Kennedy reasoned that
"[w]hen a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept
certain limitations on his or her freedom." The opinion laid out the basics of the
balancing test established by Pickering.41 Kennedy first described the government's
interest in efficiency and effective function, noting that "[g]overnment employers,
like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees'
words and actions." 2 Without this control, little chance exists for government to
provide public services efficiently.43 When public employees speak out, the views
they express have the potential to "contravene governmental policies or impair the
proper performance of governmental functions."' However, the opinion acknowl-
edges that "a citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a citizen. " 5
Kennedy summarized public employee free speech doctrine by stating that "[s]o
long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they
must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to
operate efficiently and effectively."
After reciting the recent case doctrine, however, the Court ignored the former
jurisprudence on this subject and established a new rule. The context of Ceballos'
speech was deemed unimportant.47 The location of the speech and the subject matter
" See id.
36 id.
37 id.
38 Id. Justice Souter wrote the dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, as well as an individual dissent. Justice Breyer dissented in a separate opinion.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
39 See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958.
4 id.
41 id.
42 id.
43 id.
44 id.
45 Id.
46 d.
47 See id. at 1959.
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were both marked as "nondispositive." '48 The Court instead considered only one
element of the speech-its content. "The controlling factor in Ceballos' case is that
his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy."49 This new
development was justified by pointing out that "[r]estricting speech that owes its
existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any
liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created. 50 The Court focused only on the role of the individual by stressing that
Ceballos' actions as an employee are entirely separate from his actions as a citizen.5'
Unfortunately, the Court did not clarify the test that it established. Justice Kennedy
disclaimed any reason "to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the
scope of an employee's duties."52 The only guidance the Court gave for determining
the scope of employee duties was to describe the proper inquiry as "a practical
one."53 Although formal job descriptions may act as a starting point for this analy-
sis, they cannot solely be relied upon to determine the bounds of First Amendment
protection.' The Court noted that formal job descriptions rarely bear much resem-
blance to the actual duties and expectations of an employee.5 Simply including a
task in an employee's written job description is "neither necessary nor sufficient to
demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of the employee's pro-
fessional duties for First Amendment purposes. ' '56
This discussion provided some outer limits to help lower courts determine
exactly what constitutes speech within the scope of an employee's work. This
leaves, however, a gaping middle ground for the lower courts to struggle with when
resolving future public employee speech cases. And struggle with it they have. To
quote the District Court of New Jersey, "I have no doubt that many courts will
struggle to define the breadth of Garcetti and its impact on First Amendment juris-
prudence. 57 In the first year after the Court's decision, the case was distinguished
in more than twenty cases by lower courts around the country.5
48 Id. ("That Ceballos expressed his views inside his office, rather than publicly, is not
dispositive .... The memo concerned the subject matter of Ceballos' employment, but this,
too, is nondispositive.").
49 Id. at 1959--60.
10 Id. at 1960.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1961.
53 Id.
14 Id. at 1962.
55 Id.
56 id.
" Hailey v. City of Camden, Civil No. 01-3967, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45267, at *46
(D.N.J. July 5, 2006).
58 See, e.g., Barclay v. Michalsky, 451 F. Supp. 2d 386, 396 (D. Conn. 2006); Black v.
Columbus Pub. Sch., No. 2:96-cv-326, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57768, at *2-3 (S.D. Ohio,
Aug. 17, 2006).
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C. District Court Fallout
District courts have developed very different definitions of the bounds of em-
ployee responsibility when deciding cases involving similar forms of speech. One
example of opposing views among district courts relates to the responsibility of
employees to report wrongdoing or misfeasance by co-workers.
Marie Black, an assistant principal in Columbus, Ohio, reported an affair be-
tween a parent volunteer and the principal.59 In Black, the Southern District of Ohio
noted that Garcetti did not change the law in the Sixth Circuit and cited Thompson
v. Schied.6 Although the Black court refused to apply Garcetti or Thompson to the
defense's motion to dismiss for procedural reasons, the facts of Thompson were
similar to the facts of Black.6 In Thompson, the Sixth Circuit ruled that retaliatory
employment actions suffered by a county fraud investigator who investigated
actions of a county commissioner (just as Black had to investigate her superior, the
principal) were not protected by the First Amendment because "Thompson's investi-
gation and conversations related thereto concerned his duties as an employee of the
county and therefore were matters of internal department policy and not matters of
public concern. 62
This treatment of the duty to report on co-workers is strikingly different from
the District Court of Connecticut's treatment of the issue. In Connecticut, Deborah
Barclay, a nurse, complained to supervisors that her co-workers were sleeping on
the job and using excessive restraints.63 She was placed on administrative leave as
a result of this speech because her employer claimed it had disrupted the
workplace. 6' The hospital argued that Barclay made complaints pursuant to her
official duties because employees have a duty to report violations of hospital
policy. 65 The court noted during its analysis of the scope of employee job responsi-
bilities that the inquiry required by Garcetti is "a practical one."'  This practical
19 Black, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57768, at *2.
6 Id. at *11 (discussing 977 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1992)).
61 Id. at *11-17.
62 Id. at*11-12.
63 Barclay, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
64 Id. at 391,399.
65 Id. at 395. Specifically, the hospital claimed that Work Rule #30 and Work Rule #22
were applicable in this circumstance. Work Rule #30 requires employees to report any
violations of "existing work rules, policies, procedures, or regulations" to their supervisors.
Id. The employees Barclay complained about were in violation of Work Rule #22. Work
Rule #22 provides that "[p]hysical violence, verbal abuse, inappropriate or indecent conduct
and behavior that endangers the safety and welfare of persons or property is prohibited."
Id. at 390.
66 Id. at 395.
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inquiry indicated that material issues of fact existed.' The court determined that
there was no incontrovertible evidence that the nurse's complaints were "part of the
discharge of her duties as a nurse" and held that Garcetti was not controlling.6"
In both Black and Barclay, the employee was expected to report misbehavior on
the part of her peers and was punished for this speech. In Barclay, the employee
handbook explicitly listed the expectation, but the speech merited protection because
it was not within the scope of her job responsibilities.6 In Black, the expectation
was implicit. Although the Black court did not reach the question of whether the
speech was protected, an analogous scenario in the same circuit concluded such
speech did not.7 ° Arbitrary distinctions like these will continue unless the Court
enunciates a clear standard of how to determine exactly what constitutes an
employee's job responsibilities.
More common among district court decisions than confusion or conflicting
holdings is the decision to ignore the Garcetti ruling altogether and decide the case
based on the public concern test promulgated by the Court in Connick v. Meyers. 
7
For example, in Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Center, substitute teacher Ricky
Pittman complained about the traffic in the parking lot and proposed new ideas for
resolving the issue.72 He was terminated in part as a result of this speech.73 In its
decision on the matter, the Northern District of Ohio first summarized Garcetti's
holding and then expressed concern that "some legal analysts appear to be inter-
preting Garcetti as holding that statements made by public employees will never be
protected if the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment while
making the statements."74 The court chose to narrowly interpret Garcetti as re-
quiring a "job relatedness" test.75 Accordingly, "[i]f the public employee's speech
was required by his or her job, then Garcetti applies and the statements are not pro-
tected speech. 76 The court went on to say that if the speech is not "specifically job-
related," then Garcetti is not controlling and a traditional Connick public concern
test should be applied.77 The court found it "arguable" as to whether or not the
teacher's speech concerning complaints about his responsibilities and offering new
67 Id.
68 Id. at 396.
69 Id. at 395-96.
70 Black v. Columbus Pub. Sch., No. 2:96-cv-326, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57768, at
*11-17 (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 17, 2006).
71 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
72 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910-11 (N.D. Ohio, 2006).
71 Id. at 913.
74 Id. at 929.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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ideas for managing traffic in the student parking lot was related to his job."8 As a
result, the court refused to apply Garcetti and ruled that "none of Pittman' s speech
in this area was on a matter of public concern" and, as such, the traditional Connick
analysis governed.79
11. THE PRECEDENT
Public employee speech was not always protected. In fact, for a significant
portion of the twentieth century, "the thrust of the Supreme Court's public employee
speech jurisprudence was easy to discern: public employee speech received almost
no First Amendment protection from adverse employer actions."80 The Court con-
sidered government employment a privilege as opposed to a right that justified con-
stitutional protection." The distinction between rights and privileges granted the
government incredible latitude to abridge the First Amendment rights of public
employees." Justice Holmes is often quoted as embodying this view of public em-
ployee speech. 3 Deciding on a police officer's claim for First Amendment pro-
tection in the workplace, Justice Holmes commented that "[t]he [officer] may have
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man."'' Justice Holmes went on to say that "[t]here are few employments for hire
in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free
speech.., by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he
takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. '8 5 This implied sus-
pension of constitutional rights allowed the employer to "impose any reasonable
condition upon holding offices within its control. 8 6 Although this condition
seemed reasonable to Justice Holmes, it is no longer reasonable today, and nearly
four decades of public employee speech jurisprudence serve as evidence of that fact. 7
78 id.
79 Id.
' Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1007,
1010 (2005).
81 Edward J. Velazquez, Comment, Waters v. Churchill: Government-Employer
Efficiency, Judicial Deference, and the Abandonment of Public-Employee Free Speech by
the Supreme Court, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1055, 1059 (1995).
82 Id.
83 See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 227 (2003); O'Hare Truck
Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716-17 (1996); Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,674 (1996); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,395 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents,
347 U.S. 442,472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 99 n.34 (1946); Kozel, supra note 80, at 1011.
' McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
81 Id. at517-18.
86 Id. at 518.
87 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661
630 [Vol. 16:623
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Holmes' view of public employee speech controlled the Court's jurisprudence
until 1968 with the decision of Pickering v. Board of Education.88 The importance
of Pickering results from its general exposition and description of the process for
resolving public employee free speech cases.89 The facts of the case are fairly
straightforward. Marvin Pickering, a public school teacher, was terminated after
writing a letter critical of the school board and superintendent, which the local news-
paper published shortly after the defeat of a proposed increase to the school tax
rate.' The Illinois Supreme Court upheld his termination finding that "the Board
could reasonably conclude that [Pickering' s] publication of the letter was 'detrimen-
tal to the best interests of the schools."' 9' The court denied the First Amendment
claim on the basis that by accepting a teaching position in the public school, he was
obliged to refrain from making disruptive statements about the operation of the
school.92 The court explicitly noted that had Pickering not held a teaching position,
there would have been no doubt of his right to engage in the offending speech. 93
The Supreme Court overturned the state court ruling and forever changed public
employee free speech jurisprudence. The Court developed a two-part process for
analyzing public employee free speech cases. First, the Court recognized that the
government has interests as an employer in "regulating the speech of its employees
that 'differ significantly' from government interests justifying 'regulation of the
speech of the citizenry in general."94 After recognizing this interest, the Court re-
quired a balancing of the government's interest with that of a citizen' s.95 The Court
articulated the heart of the problem in any case as the difficulty of "arriv[ing] at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon mat-
ters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 96
The next case to significantly alter public employee free speech jurisprudence
was Connick v. Myers.97 Sheila Myers, the Assistant District Attorney for Orleans
(1994); Rankin, 483 U.S. at 378; Connick, 461 U.S. 138; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968).
88 Pickering, 391 U.S. 563. For a full analysis of the Court's shift in public employee free
speech jurisprudence see William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
89 Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free Speech,
30 TEX. TECH L. REv. 5, 8 (1999).
90 Id. at 7.
9' Pickering, 391 U.S. at 567.
92 Id.
93 Id.
4 Schoen, supra note 89, at 8.
95 Id.
96 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
97 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Parish, Louisiana received a transfer order.98 In response to the order, she developed
a survey asking for employee opinions on the "office transfer policy, office morale,
the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in superiors, and
whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns." 99 Myers was
terminated following the distribution of the questionnaire.'° Upon granting certiorari
from the Fifth Circuit, the Court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff holding that
"[w]hen employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should
enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment."' '°
In reaching this decision, the Court applied the balancing test laid out years
earlier in Pickering.'0 2 However, before reaching the balancing test, the Court first
necessitated a determination of whether Myers' speech related to a matter of public
concern. 10 3 This decision attempted to clarify what exactly constitutes public
concern. "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must
be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed
by the whole record."'' 4 The Court determined that only one of the questions on
Myers' survey constituted a matter of public concern-whether assistant district attor-
neys felt pressured to support the political campaigns of candidates supported by the
office.'0 5 The Pickering balancing test was then applied in order to determine the
constitutionality of Myers' dismissal.'° The Court held that the district court "erred
in imposing an unduly onerous burden on the State to justify Myers' discharge."' 7
Several significant holdings can be extracted from Connick. First, no First
Amendment violation exists if the offensive speech does not relate to a matter of
public concern.0 8 Second, whether the speech relates to a matter of public concern
is not a question of fact, but one of law."° The third holding specifies that speech
pertaining to a matter of public concern should be "determined by the content, form,
and context of the speech as revealed by the entire record, and possibly, by the em-
ployee's motive for speaking.""' Fourth, reasonable belief by the government that
98 Stevan C. Dittman, Note, Constitutional Law-Supreme Court Restricts First
Amendment Rights of Public Employees-Connick v. Myers, 58 TUL.L.REV. 831, 831 (1984).
99 Id.
100 Id.
10 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
102 Dittman, supra note 98, at 836.
103 id.
"o Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
105 Id. at 149.
'0 Dittman, supra note 98, at 838.
107 Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-50.
0s Schoen, supra note 89, at 17.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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the speech will negatively affect agency operations may justify the employee's
termination without evidence of actual impact, even if matters of public concern
are implicated."'
The impact of the Connick decision was clear. "What was implicit in Pickering
and prior cases is now explicit: The First Amendment is not implicated when a
public employee is terminated for speech that does not pertain to matters of public
concern."" 2 Furthermore, when the employee's speech does relate to matters of
public concern so as to require the balancing of competing employee and employer
interests, "the employer's 'reasonable belief' that the speech would cause agency
disruption, destroy close working relationships, or undermine managerial authority
is sufficient justification to strike the balance in favor of the employer."' 3
The implications of the Connick decision led some to predict the limitations of
public employee speech enunciated in Garcetti. One such prediction opined that
"Connick has undoubtedly worsened the plight of public employees wishing to
speak out with the same freedom enjoyed by other members of the public. After
Connick, a public employee who has spoken on any subject connected with her job
has little constitutional protection against employer retaliation.""..4
The third and final major public employee free speech case decided before
Garcetti was Rankin v. McPherson.115 That case differs somewhat from the other
primary public employee cases because the speech in question did not directly
criticize a public official. Ardith McPherson was a clerical employee in the Harris
County, Texas, Constable's Office." 6 McPherson and some fellow employees
heard on an office radio of the attempted assassination of then-President Ronald
Reagan." 7 Upon hearing the report, McPherson spoke to a co-worker, who was also
her boyfriend, and said, "[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him."" 8 The
remark was overheard by a deputy constable, and the constable fired McPherson. "9
The Court' applied the two-step Connick analysis beginning with whether the
speech pertained to a matter of public concern. 20 The employee's remarks pertained
to a matter of public concern, and the inappropriate nature of the statement was
deemed irrelevant to that determination. 12' The Court emphasized that "debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and... may well include
"' Id.
2 Id. at 24.
113 id.
... Andrew C. Alter, Note, Public Employees' Free Speech Rights: Connick v. Myers
Upsets the Delicate Pickering Balance, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 173, 198 (1984).
"' Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
116 Id. at 380.117 Id. at 38 1.
118 Id.
"9 Id. at 381-82.
120 Schoen, supra note 89, at 26.
12 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387.
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vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."'2
2
The finding that McPherson's speech was a matter of public concern triggered
the "fact-intensive balancing of competing employee and employer interests...
required by Pickering."'2 3 The Court emphasized the importance of the context of
the statement. 24 In fact, the Court explicitly noted that the speech in question "will
not be considered in a vacuum; the manner, time, and place of the employee's
expression are relevant, as is the context in which the dispute arose."'' 25 The Court
considered several important factors, including "whether the statement impairs
discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on
close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are nec-
essary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the
regular operation of the enterprise.' 26 Ultimately, the Court found in the em-
ployee's favor because the statement did not interfere with "the efficient functioning
of the office."'' 27 McPherson did not speak in a public area, her statement had no
chance to discredit the office, and none of the other employees in the room over-
heard the remark, so the statement did not affect office operations. 28 Although the
Court's balancing in this instance favored the employee, it is more important to note
that "the balancing was obviously and painfully fact-intensive and fact-sensitive."'29
Most clearly demonstrated by the three important public employee free speech
cases is the indication that there is plenty of room for reasonable judges to differ in
opinion. The Connick majority favored the employer with four Justices dissenting,
while the Rankin majority favored the employee with four Justices dissenting. 3 °
The public employee-free speech jurisprudence has been anything but clear. In the
thirty years since Pickering, each case has developed new factors in addition to the
original balancing test.' 3' Each of these factors may have significant weight in a
court's resolution of a First Amendment claim.132 "Whether the employee's speech
pertains to matters of public concern is a threshold issue that a court must determine
by the content, form, and context of the speech."'' 33 The threshold analysis also
involves "the employee's motive or reason for speaking."'' 4 Although these factors
122 Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
123 Schoen, supra note 89, at 26.
'24 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
125 id.
126 id.
127 Id. at 389.
128 Id.
129 Schoen, supra note 89, at 28.
130 id.
131 Id. at 29-30.
132 id.
133 Id. at 29.
134 id.
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have clearly been enumerated, the Court has declined to declare which of the many
factors should be afforded the most weight. 35 If the employee's speech meets the
threshold requirement and pertains to matters of public concern, "courts must
subject the competing interests of public employee and government employer to the
fact-intensive balancing that Pickering requires."'136 The Garcetti decision clearly
adds to this discourse, but what exactly it adds is unclear.
111. THE RESULT
Employees must necessarily compromise some of their rights of free ex-
pression. By accepting employment, "[p]art of what the employee agrees to... is
speaking in a way that promotes [the] employer's mission, as defined by [the] em-
ployer."'137 Continued employment and compensation reward the employee for that
sacrifice. The Garcetti ruling creates a serious predicament for government employees
who "witness corruption, fraud, waste, or mismanagement in the workplace" and
wish to speak out about it.' 3' These employees are left with few options. The first
option is internal disclosure of their observations in accordance with workplace pro-
cedure. 139 This choice requires employees to accept the risk that their speech may
be heard by hostile or unsympathetic supervisors, in which case the First Amend-
ment will not protect them from retaliation."4 The second, and similarly unpleasant,
option is to "hold a press conference on the front steps of the government build-
ing."'' This action may help to assure First Amendment protection for the dis-
closure but will also publicly embarrass government officials, including the
employee's supervisor.'4 2 The third option is the least pleasant-simply requiring
that employees "[k]eep quiet and say nothing."'43
A. The Whistleblower Effects
The Garcetti ruling caused concern for the rights of government whistleblowers
nationwide.' Attorneys representing government whistleblowers denounced the
135 Id.
136 Id. at 29-30.
13 Kozel, supra note 80, at 1033.
138 Hearings, supra note 3, at 75 (prepared statement of Richard Ceballos, Deputy District
Attorney, County of Los Angeles, California).
139 Id.
140 id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
'44 "As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, the National
Whistleblower Center has fielded hundreds of calls from concerned citizens, public
employees and members of the media." National Whistleblower Center, http://www
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ruling, declaring that it constituted a major setback to the protection of whistle-
blower rights. '45 Commentators mentioned threats to public health, safety, and national
security.'" Prior to the Court's decision, an editorial co-authored by the famous FBI
whistleblower, Colleen Rowley,'47 warned that "[a] ruling against First Amendment
rights would muzzle those who know security issues better than any oversight body
officials can hope to create."'' 48 Sole reliance on Congress to oversee everything hap-
pening at the various levels of government is foolish because such a task is im-
possible.' 49 Rowley emphasized that "government employees owe their ultimate
allegiance not to their supervisor or president but to America: its Constitution, laws
and citizens."50
Government employers highly prize loyalty and severely punish disloyalty. In
fact, it is not uncommon for agency heads to attempt to prevent the speech or
discredit the employee by firing or demoting employees before they present
controversial reports. 5' "Neither the public nor the government itself can hold
.whistleblowers.org (last visited Nov. 18, 2007). The National Whistleblower Center con-
siders this ruling "the most significant judicial threat to employee whistleblowers in nearly
forty years." Hearings, supra note 3, at 29 (prepared statement of Stephen M. Kohn, Chair,
National Whistleblower Center).
14 David G. Savage, Court Curbs the Speech of Public Employees, L.A. TIMES, May 31,
2006, at Al. Examples include public hospital workers discouraged from revealing known
dangers and police dissuaded from exposing corruption. Id.
'46 Id.; see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 4 (opening statement of Tom Davis, Chairman,
Comm. on H. Gov't Reform). "The inability of government workers to express their concerns
about the smallest of issues involving their jobs.., can lead to the greatest of harms: defeat
by an enemy." Id.
14' Rowley wrote a thirteen-page letter to the congressional committee that investigated
the government's preparedness for the 9/11 attacks; the letter described misrepresentations
made by the F.B.I. Director and the mishandling of information leading up to the attacks. See
Excerpts from F.B.I. Agent's Letter to Director Mueller, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at A15;
Romesh Ratnesar & Michael Weisskopf, How the FBI Blew the Case, TIME, Jun. 3, 2002,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1002553,00.html; James
Risen & David Johnston, Agent Complaints Lead F.B.I. Director to Ask for Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2002, at Al.
148 Coleen Rowley & Dylan Blaylock, Editorial, Occupational Hazard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 2005, at A19.
149 Id.
0 Id. In Rowley's ominous words, "[c]utting off protection is a recipe for disasters of
mass proportions." Id.
'' Brief for Respondent at 14, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No. 04-473),
2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 476, at *40 (citing Campbell v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 155 F.3d
950,954 (8th Cir. 1998) and Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823,830 (3d Cir. 1994),
as examples).
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officials accountable for abuse unless public employees can disclose government
misconduct without fear of reprisals."'52
The significance of the decision also roused the attention of Congress. The
House Committee on Government Reform held a full committee hearing on June 29,
2006, during the 109th Congress.5 3 The purpose of the hearing was "to understand
what this case decided, the grounds on which it was decided, and what it means for
the rights and interests of all whistleblowers, Federal and State."'5 4 The witnesses
before the hearing included representatives from the National Whistleblower Center,
Senior Executives Association, National Treasury Employees Union, CATO
Institute, National School Boards Association, and the American Federation of
Government Employees.'5 5 The nearly unanimous consensus of those testifying at
the hearing was the necessity of legislative action to protect federal employees who
choose to report government misconduct.156 No such legislation is forthcoming, how-
ever, and the burden of protecting public employee speech still rests with the courts.
Currently, the Whistleblower Protection Act safeguards federal public
employees from retaliation for reporting "(i) a violation of any law, rule, or
regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.'
' 57
152 id.
3 Hearings, supra note 3.
'5 Id. at 4 (opening statement of Tom Davis, Chairman, Comm. on H. Gov't Reform).
155 Hearings, supra note 3.
156 Id. The National Whistleblower Center recommended the following action:
(1) A uniform federal whistleblower protection law providing a
consistent safety net to all public and private sector employees who
report violations of federal laws and regulations; (2) utilization of the
procedures recently adopted overwhelmingly by Congress for the
protection of corporate whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
This law both explicitly protects internal/official duty whistleblowers
and provides for an efficient and effective administrative review of
whistleblower claims.
Id. at 41-42 (prepared statement of Stephen M. Kohn, Chair, National Whistleblower
Center). Similarly, the National Treasury Employees Union recommended strengthening the
Whistleblower Protection Act, protecting internal policy disagreements, and curbing agency
tendencies toward unnecessary secrecy. Id. at 102-03 (statement of Barbara Atkin, Deputy
General Counsel, National Treasury Employees Union).
'" Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2000).
(b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take,
recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to
such authority...
(8) take or fail to take . . . a personnel action with respect to any
employee or applicant for employment because of-(A) any disclosure
of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or
applicant reasonably believes evidences-(i) a violation of any law,
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Unfortunately, the Whistleblower Protection Act does not adequately defend federal
employees because the current interpretations "do not recognize that whistle-
blowing activity sometimes occurs in the form of disclosures made directly to the
person violating the law or engaging in the wrongdoing."'' 8 Another form of dis-
closure not protected by the Whistleblower Protection Act occurs when the
employee is "just doing [his or her] job."'59 That hole in whistleblower protection
was the precise issue before the Court in Garcetti.60 Similarly, state whistleblower
laws cannot be relied upon to protect employees who wish to speak out.
161
Any reform of the national whistleblower laws or court decisions presents a
significant task. The challenge is to strike a balance so that "[flederal employees are
encouraged to report wrongdoing and are assured protection from reprisal.' 62 Yet,
the reform must also ensure that federal workforce managers have the needed tools
to manage their workplace effectively. 63 However, the real goal of any reform
rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of
funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety, if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited
by law and if such information is not specifically required by Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct
of foreign affairs ....
Id.
158 Hearings, supra note 3, at 80 (prepared statement of William L. Bransford, General
Counsel, Senior Executives Association). The Senior Executives Association "represents the
interests of career federal executives." Id. at 79.
9 Id. at 76 (statement of William L. Bransford, General Counsel, Senior Executives
Association). Stephen Kohn of the National Whistleblower Center noted that an
"overwhelming majority of whistleblowers initially (and often exclusively) report
misconduct to their managers. For all practical purposes, public employees initiate their
whistleblowing within their chain-of-command, based on observations made while
performing their official duties." Id. at 34 (prepared statement of Stephen M. Kohn, Chair,
National Whistleblower Center). In fact most whistleblowers never have the "gumption to
go outside of the system." Id. More persuasively, 86% of all sustained whistleblower claims
that were filed under section 1983 (like Garcetti's) were internal complaints. Id. at 35.
Furthermore, "between 62-78% of all sustained whistleblower cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
concerned protected activity directly related to an employee's job duties." Id.
6o Id. at 76 (statement of William L. Bransford, General Counsel, Senior Executives
Association).
161 Hearings, supra note 3, at 32-33 (statement of Stephen M. Kohn, Chair, National
Whistleblower Center) (noting that 58% of state whistleblower laws do not protect internal
whistleblowers and six states require employees to contact their supervisors as a condition
of receiving statutory protection). Ninety-five percent of which do provide some protection
for internal or official duty whistleblowers, provide a lower level of procedural and/or
remedial protection than section 1983. Id. at 33.
162 Id. at 76 (statement of William L. Bransford, General Counsel, Senior Executives
Association).
163 Id.
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effort must be "the creation of a workplace environment where employees feel free
to discuss waste, fraud and abuse with employers, and employers feel more com-
fortable fixing the problem than covering it up.' 164
Creating incentives for public employees to go to the press before speaking with
their superiors leads to a perverse result-employees should be allowed to discuss
those items of public concern with their superiors rather than run to the press. As
Representative Tom Davis observed, "We need better government, not more
headlines."' 165 The incentive must be for public employees to tell the truth without
fear of reprisal. The consequences of employee silence may be far-reaching and
disastrous.' 66 Threats of termination from public employment are powerful
instruments for inhibiting speech. 67 For this reason, "courts should employ a higher
standard than mere 'reasonable belief' in order to ensure that public employers do
not abuse their authority over employees and silence speech simply because it
displeases a supervisor."' 68
One of the great concerns surrounding a per se rule is the potential it has to
create the acceptance of so-called "viewpoint discrimination. ' 69  Viewpoint
discrimination is a particularly harmful form of content discrimination.' 7' Typically,
"[a]bsent the most compelling circumstances, discrimination against disfavored
ideas or viewpoints is almost never tolerated under the First Amendment."' 71 The
per se rule allows government employers to suppress only the viewpoints they
disfavor by reprimanding employees who disagree with them. 172 "Government
employers could engage in this type of viewpoint discrimination without fear of
"6 Id. at 4 (opening statement of Tom Davis, Chairman, Comm. on H. Gov't Reform).
165 Id.
"6 Id. at 36 (prepared statement of Stephen M. Kohn, Chair, National Whistleblower
Center). The consequences of public employee silence were listed poignantly by Kohn when
expressing the credo of the National Whistleblower Center-"Freedom to Tell the Truth."
Id. at 28. Kohn listed examples including "the safety of the Space Shuttle before it is
scheduled to launch .... the financial condition of a corporation where Americans have
invested their life savings .... [and] the need for a FISA search warrant when a suspected
terrorist is identified." Id.
167 Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 121, 146 (1996).
168 Id.
169 Marni M. Zack, Note, Public Employee Free Speech: The Policy ReasonsforRejecting
a Per Se Rule Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. REv. 893,912 (2005).
17' Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the FirstAmendment:
The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 542 (1998).
171 id.
17 Zack, supra note 169, at 913.
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repercussion" because the rule established in Garcetti gives public employees no
legal recourse if the speech is job-related.'7 3
B. Two Groups Particularly Affected: Lawyers and Teachers
This ruling uniquely affects the legal profession. "One of the most important
unanswered questions in legal ethics is how the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of expression ought to apply to the speech of attorneys acting in their official
capacity."' 74 The heightened standard of ethical obligations placed on lawyers
requires speech in many settings. Police misconduct is among the specific types of
information that government prosecutors must reveal, but Garcetti denies them First
Amendment protection for any resultant retaliation.'75 A criminal prosecutor has the
responsibility "not merely to prosecute crimes, but also to make certain that the truth
is honored to the fullest extent possible."' 76 The prosecutor fulfills this responsibil-
ity when he or she determines that a case lacks merit and should be dismissed after
careful evaluation and informs his or her superiors of this conclusion.'77 The
elimination of First Amendment protection for job-related speech of public
employees does little to encourage a prosecutor to recommend that a case should not
proceed, even though this may be the just course of action.'
Any law that serves to silence a "lawyer['s] criticism of the law and those who
administer it interferes with the long-established 'rebellious' dimension of the
lawyer's social function."'7 Lawyers, especially those who serve in the public
sector, are supposed to "give voice to dissenters, outsiders, and unpopular clients
and challenge the exercise of state power."'8 ° Tightening free speech protections in
the public workplace does not serve these interests, and Garcetti certainly "does
little" to assist government attorneys to balance professional responsibilities and free
' Id. at 914.
'7 W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 305
(2001).
17' Krystal LoPilato, Case Comment, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Lose First
Amendment Protectionfor Speech Within Their Job Duties, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
537, 544 (2006) (citing professional canons and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), as
the sources of the disclosure requirement).
176 United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 127 (1st Cir. 1988).
'77 Brief of National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 21, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No. 04-473),
2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 481, at *32.
178 id.
179 Wendel, supra note 174, at 333.
180 Id.
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speech.' We should not leave prosecutors unprotected and "forced to choose
between the Constitution and career prospects." 1
8 2
One alternative course of action proposed is the adoption of the per se rule in a
majority of circumstances but preserving traditional balancing in situations in which
professional codes of ethics or constitutional canons require speech.8 3 "Recogniz-
ing that an individual may be compelled to speak in such situations would establish
appropriate boundaries for judicial inquiry, protect significant speech, and promote
efficient administration."'" Although certainly preferable to the complete
elimination of protection for job-related speech, a rule preserving protection only
in cases in which a professional code or constitutional canon requires speech is not
enough. Whistleblowers must be allowed and encouraged to speak out, even when
not required to do so, and First Amendment protection is one of the few tools to
encourage this speech.
Another professional area understandably concerned by the new restrictions on
public employee free speech is the education arena. The Court recognizes that
freedom of expression related to academic scholarship may give cause for worry.'85
However, the majority opinion glossed over this concern, stating simply: "We need
not ... decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same
manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching."' 86 Justice
Souter's dissent recognized the concern with considerable trepidation. 8 7 Applica-
tion of the per se rule adopted by the Court to professors at public educational
institutions as state employees is a frightening prospect. Professors who frequently
publish articles and books, make presentations, participate in speaking engagements,
and have scholarly debates all speak as employees within the scope of their job
responsibilities.' 8  University professors who have a unique knowledge of a
specialty can, and often do, contribute significantly to the debate in any number of
fields, including areas of intellectual discourse that lead to the critique of various
181 LoPilato, supra note 175, at 544.
182 Leading Cases, 120 HARv. L. REv. 125, 279 (2006).
183 Id. at 273.
184 id. at 273-74.
185 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006) ("There is some argument that
expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-
speech jurisprudence.").
186 id.
187 Id. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter commented that the breadth of the new rule
"is spacious enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor" and
expressed the hope that the majority did not intend to "imperil First Amendment protection
of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak
and write 'pursuant to official duties."' Id. (citation omitted).
188 Zack, supra note 169, at 911-12.
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governmental operations."' The adoption of the per se rule has the unfortunate
effect of diminishing open debate and is the first step toward eradicating free speech
protections in public universities, "one of the places where it is most important to
protect them."'' Another important area of teacher speech occurs when teachers
speak up to report instances of harm to students.'' This form of speech "often does
(and sometimes must) occur in the course of the teacher's performance of his or her
regular job functions." '92 The per se rule adopted by the Court does not protect
speech made as part of the employee's duties, and as a result many instances of
important public speech are not protected. 193
C. Balancing Test
In order to find the proper equilibrium between the government's interest in an
efficient and effective workplace and the constitutional protections guaranteed to
public employees, the Court must revert to the direct balancing that Pickering
initially developed. A direct balancing test "will provide the highest degree of
protection for employee speech" and also "promote public debate concerning how
the government should operate."'" More importantly, "this approach will lead to
a balanced public employment relationship which serves to prevent personal abuse
of authority and gives adequate consideration to the conflicting interests
involved."' 95 Legal scholar Pengtian Ma advocates a return to the direct balancing
test to focus on whether speech actually causes disruption in the workplace, as
opposed to the current focus on the content of the speech.' 96 Achieving a proper
balance between the government's interest in efficiency and the employee's interest
in free speech requires acknowledgement that "neither interest is absolute."' 97
Choosing between the two can only be accomplished fairly by striking a balance that
keeps both interests in mind.
The Pickering and Connick decisions are not perfect. Both have created
controversy, and scholars have called for changes in the law for quite some time. 98
189 Id. at 912.
190 Id.
' ' Brief of the National Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at
8, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
472, at *12.
192 Id.
193 Some scholars advocate the creation of a new zone of speech labeled "academic
speech." For a full discussion, see Jennifer Elrod, Academics, Public Employee Speech, and
the Public University, 22 BuFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 3 (2003).
'94 Ma, supra note 167, at 147.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 144.
197 Id. at 139.
"98 See Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on
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The per se rule adopted by the Court is not, however, the answer. A public
employee's choice to speak publicly in connection with his or her employment may
be of great public significance although it may cause disruption in the workplace.'
Criticism of a public employer or disclosure of public official's wrongdoing must
not be precluded from First Amendment protection simply because of the potential
for disruption.2"0 Freedom of speech is often considered a "delicate and vulnerable"
constitutional right, and public employee speech is especially vulnerable.20' Often,
anyone who chooses to speak makes a deliberate choice to do so after considering
the potential benefits and costs or risks associated with the speech.20 2 The public
employee bears all the risks of the speaking out, but the public at large captures the
benefits of the speech in the form of a "better understanding of public policy and the
operation of government. 2 3 The public employee's incentives are already "skewed
in favor of silence," and further tipping the balance against speech is unadvisable.2 °4
Furthermore, the promotion of free speech should be considered a policy goal
not to be undervalued. Free speech should be considered "an end in itself," and an
important one at that.205 Four traditional justifications for free speech as a policy
goal include the discovery of truth, promotion of democratic self-government, the
protection of dissenters, and self-fulfillment of the speaker. 26 The intrinsic value
of free speech comes from the "sense of satisfaction" a speaker receives from
striving to be heard, resulting in the realization or fulfillment of the inner self.207
Freedom of speech is a laudable goal and a constitutional guarantee.
D. The Policy Considerations
Several policy considerations do support the per se rule adopted by the Court
in Garcetti. Three concerns present the most influential arguments on behalf of the
rule.20 8 First, public employees often speak on behalf of the state, and as a result
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988); Ma, supra note 167; Rosenthal, supra
note 170; Velazquez, supra note 81.
" Ma, supra note 167, at 140-41.
200 Id.
201 Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech:
Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REv. 939, 960 (2001).
202 See id.
203 id.
204 Id.
20o Ma, supra note 167, at 127. "Free speech is not only a means of enlightening the
public, but also an end in itself." Id.
206 See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 174, at 406-23.
207 Ma, supra note 167, at 139-40.
208 See Zack, supra note 169, at 904. The policy considerations are derived from a Fourth
Circuit case which developed a per se rule in 2000, before the decision in Garcetti. Urofsky
v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001). In Urofsky, six
professors in Virginia challenged the constitutionality of a Virginia law that prohibits state
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their words may be construed as statements of official government policy.2 9
Second, federal whistleblower statutes developed because of the lack of an express
constitutional right in this area provide enough protection already.2 1 The third
policy argument in favor of a per se rule is the worry of creating a constitutional
claim for every public workplace dispute.21'
Public employees often speak on the behalf of the state during fulfillment of
their employment responsibilities. However, this is not always the case. This is the
reason for the multi-factored test set out by Connick, instructing courts to analyze
the "content, form, and context" of the speech to determine whether the employee
was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern or as an employee. 22 The
state's burden to justify allegedly discriminatory treatment of an employee depends
upon the nature of the employee's speech.2 3 Factual circumstances differ,
necessitating a balancing test.
The per se rule adopted by the Court in this case inadequately addresses the
broad array of factual situations in which a claim may be brought. The Pickering
Court understood the "enormous variety of fact situations" which might result in
public employee litigation and found it neither "appropriate [nor] feasible to attempt
to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged."21 4
Unfortunately, "this territory is simply too complex to be drawing such distinct lines
in the sand., 2 15
Although the federal Whistleblower Protection Act provides some protection
to employees who wish to speak out about wrongdoing in their workplace, this pro-
tection inadequately protects the free speech rights that public employees deserve.
Current case law interpreting the federal Whistleblower Protection Act "requires
an employee complaining of retaliation to show 'irrefragable proof' that the person
criticized was not acting in good faith and in compliance with the law. 216 Even
more significantly, "federal employees have been held to be unprotected for state-
ments made in connection with normal employment duties. 21 7 State whistleblower
employees from accessing sexually explicit material on state-owned computers unless the
employee is given special permission from a state agency head for access in connection
with a bona fide research project. Id. at 404-05. The court held that because the materials
were accessed "for the purpose of carrying out employment duties," it was not a regulation
of the speech of a citizen and was necessary to pursue the legitimate goals of the employer.
Id. at 408-09.
209 Zack, supra note 169, at 904.
210 Id.
211 id.
212 Id. at 915-16 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
213 Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
214 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968).
215 LoPilato, supra note 175, at 537.
216 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1971 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378,1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000)).
217 Id. at 1971 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Huffman v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 263
[Vol. 16:623
2007] STIFLING THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE 645
statutes have been interpreted similarly to prevent protection for employees in the
regular course of business.218 Thus, reliance on whistleblower statutes for the pro-
tection of the constitutional right of free speech granted to public employees is unwise.
Disruption in the workplace is the rallying cry for lower First Amendment
protection. "[Tihe primary function of a government agency is to provide efficient
services to the public, and if a government employer were second-guessed every
time it disciplined a public employee, services could grind to a halt."2 9 This fear
is expressed through the notion that instituting a balancing test may result in a dra-
matic increase in the volume of First Amendment cases.220 Increased litigation will
"substantial[ly] impact the operation and efficiency of government employers"
because "civil rights actions brought by public employees are burdensome to de-
fend, disruptive to the working environment and often associated with large jury
awards., 22' Because of fear that the balancing standard would "impair government
offices' ability to function 'if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter,' the Supreme Court has refused to employ a balancing test when addressing
public employee speech issues that involve matters only of personal concern." 2 '2
It is true that "the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and
control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. 223 However, this
snowball argument does not carry much weight and can be countered in three
respects. First, it expounds a restricted perception of efficiency; viewing efficiency
in such a narrow manner undermines the interests and analysis.224 A more thorough
analysis of government efficiency considers the purpose and goals of the organiza-
tion.22' As opposed to hampering office operations, free speech may actually have
the effect of enhancing efficiency "by facilitating the flow of information and
improving decision-making. 226
Secondly, the likelihood that Garcetti will prevent further litigation is low be-
cause it leaves so much room for discretion in determining the scope of what speech
F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
218 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
219 David L. Hudson, Jr., Balancing Act: Public Employees and Free Speech, 3 FIRST
REPS. 1, 2 (Dec. 2002).
220 Petitioners' Reply Brief at 16, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No. 04-
473), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 565, at *26.
221 Id. at 16; *26-27. One journalist proffered the scenario that it would be necessary to
"block out 23 hours a day on every court docket in the country to litigate these claims."
Dahlia Lithwick, Whistle Blowhards, SLATE, Oct. 12, 2005, available at http://www.slate
.com/id/2127922/.
222 Ma, supra note 167, at 142 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
223 Connick, 461 U.S. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974).
224 Leading Cases, supra note 182, at 280.
225 id.
226 Id. (discussing democratic theory and organizational studies as evidence of the
efficiency of free speech).
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is part of an employee's job responsibility.227 District court decisions in the first six
months following the Garcetti decision clearly indicate that it does "not provide
sufficient clarity to preempt such actions."'22 Furthermore, the claim that protecting
First Amendment rights will require public entities and judges "to expend resources
[defending and] deciding those cases has rarely been thought dispositive. '29 The
Pickering and Connick rulings have been in place for more than twenty years, and
the efficiency of the government workplace has yet to fall to shambles because of
the burden of litigating free speech concerns in work tasks. 23" There is no reason to
believe that litigation over whether speech was within the scope of an employee's job
responsibility will be any less burdensome than litigation intended to balance an
employee's free speech interests against the public employer's interests in efficiency.
The establishment of a per se rule helps to clearly define what constitutes public
speech in the workplace context by eliminating job-related speech from First
Amendment coverage. This definition is important because "[w]hen the courts fail
to use reliable definitions to determine what counts as legally protected 'public'
speech for public employees, those persons suffer as employees and as citizens,
because the basis of their constitutional liberties is significantly compromised. 23'
Courts are obligated to give a clear demarcation of what type of speech and under
what conditions that speech is permissible, protected, and free.232 However, the
supposed necessity of a clear definition is not justification to develop a per se rule
that eliminates First Amendment protection for such a large and important body of
public employee speech.
CONCLUSION
Employer reactions to this decision are obvious. Any "'smart employer[]' [will]
now be sure to encourage the use of internal complaint mechanisms to deter
employees from taking their complaints public and thus enjoying the prospect of
227 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
22 Leading Cases, supra note 182, at 281.
229 Rosenthal, supra note 170, at 546. For instance, the Court rejected the suggestion that
public contractors should not be given the First Amendment right not to be discharged as a
result of their political beliefs because of the potential burden on public bodies to defend the
ensuing litigation. Id. (citing O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712,
724 (1996), and Bd. of County Conm'rs v. Unbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 681 (1996)).
230 Justice Souter pointed out during oral argument that there has been no deluge of claims
based on the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Pickering balance since it was clarified in
1988. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No.
04-473), 2005 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 52, at *5.
231 Jeffrey St. John, Matters of Public Concern: Reconceptualizing Public Employee Free
Speech Through Definitional Argument, 6 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 261, 279 (2003).
232 Id. at 279-80 (requiring a "lucid and argumentatively consistent" definition of speech
that is a matter of public concern).
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greater constitutional protection." '233 Resolving the remaining deficiencies in public
employee-free speech jurisprudence is not a task for amateurs. The problem is
finding the middle between two extremes. A bright-line rule is impractical. "An
extreme version of either rule will either destroy employer authority or chill
important speech from whistle-blowers.2 3" We must not forget that "the fundamen-
tal purpose of the First Amendment is to ensure that 'debate on public issues. . . be
uninhibited, robust and wide-open."'235
The federal government employs 2,720,462 individuals.236 State and local
government agencies have an additional 5,078,268 and 11,715,128 individuals on
the payroll respectively.2 37 This evidence of "[t]he sheer number of public
employees shows the importance of ensuring that First Amendment rights are a
living reality rather than abstract theory for government workers." The Supreme
Court long ago dismissed "the notion that employees forfeit their constitutional
protections when they enter the public workplace was long ago dismissed by the
Supreme Court. 238 Unfortunately, the Garcetti decision severely limits the First
Amendment protections of public employees in the workplace by refusing to protect
speech that occurs as a part of job responsibilities. Simply because an employee
enters the doors of a government employer, to serve the people of this country, does
not mean that the employee relinquishes his or her rights as a citizen. 239 The true
loss resulting from this decision is the loss to the public. 240 Americans have lost
their right to know "what is happening in their own government ... what their
elected and non-elected public officials are doing ... if their taxpayer money is
being spent properly or being wasted and.., if their public officials are engaged in
corrupt or fraudulent conduct., 24 '
A return to the Pickering balance does not cure all the ills of public employee
speech jurisprudence. However, the per se rule adopted by the Court in Garcetti
does more harm than good in its aim to clarify what speech is protected and what
233 Greenhouse, supra note 33 (citing an interview with Daniel P. Westman, a lawyer
with the firm of Morrison & Foerster who advises employers on whistleblower issues). Prior
to the Garcetti decision, public employers were cautioned to identify a "nonspeech related
rationale for the action" prior to taking action against an employee and to rely solely on that
reason when terminating the employee. John F. Fatino, Public Employers and E-mail: A
Primerfor the Practitioner and the Public Professional, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 131, 168 (2003).
234 Lithwick, supra note 221.
235 Hudson, supra note 219, at 37 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
236 United States Census Bureau, Public Employment and Payroll Data, http://www.census
.gov/govs/www/apes.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
237 Id.
238 Hudson, supra note 219, at 37.
239 Hearings, supra note 3, at 73 (prepared statement of Richard Ceballos, Deputy District
Attorney, County of Los Angeles, California).
240 Id.
241 Id.
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speech leaves government employers free to retaliate against employees. 2  The
Garcetti decision leaves a vast amount of important public employee speech
unprotected. The only cure is a return to balancing the interests of the public
employee in free speech against the government employer's interest in managing an
effective and efficient workplace.
242 Other scholars have indicated that this decision not only harms the public employee
speech arena, but also denotes a coming era of constitutional formalism. See, e.g., Charles
W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal
Formalism, 15 WM. &MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173 (2007).
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